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Exchange rate-based stabilization programs in chronic-inflation countries have often 
been accompanied by an initial expansion of private consumption followed by a 
contraction.  This consumption cycle has been attributed to lack of credibility, in the 
sense that the public views the reduction in the devaluation rate as temporary. This paper 
assesses the quantitative relevance of the 'temporariness' hypothesis by comparing the 
predictions of a simple model to the actual figures for seven major programs. The paper 
concludes that nominal interest rates must fall substantially for the 'temporariness' 
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1. Introduction 
Exchange rate-based disinflation programs in chronic-inflation countries have 
often been accompanied by an initial expansion of private consumption followed 
by a later contraction (see Kiguel and Liviatan, 1992; Vegh, 1992). 1  Figure 1 
illustrates this consumption pattern for seven major exchange rate-based stabilization 
programs: the Southern-Cone orthodox stabilization plans of the late 1970s in Argentina, 
Chile, and Uruguay (the so-called 'tablitas'), and the heterodox plans 
of the mid-1980s in Argentina (Austral plan), Brazil (Cruzado plan), Israel, and 
Mexico. Interestingly, this consumption cycle seems to take place irrespective of 
whether the program is eventually successful or not. In effect, as Figure 1 illustrates, 
the late recession took place in both failed programs (the tablitas, and the Austral 
and Cruzado plans) and successful programs (Israel). 2  3
 
Several hypotheses have been advanced to explain the consumption cycle 
associated with exchange rate-based stabilization. A first explanation, suggested 
by Rodriguez (1982), relies on an initial fall in real interest rates, which results 
from the assumption of adaptive expectations, to generate an expansion in 
aggregate demand. Later in the program, the effects of an appreciated real   4
exchange rate prevail and a recession ensues. Rodriguez's (1982) hypothesis, 
however, cannot explain the boom in those programs in which real interest rates 
rose.  Furthermore, his results may not hold in a utility-maximizing framework 
(see Calvo and Vegh, 1994). 
A second explanation is based on wealth effects, which may result from lack of 
Ricardian equivalence (Helpman and Razin, 1987), future reductions in government 
spending (Drazen and Helpman, 1988), or increases in labor supply (De 
Gregorio et al., 1993; Roldos, 1993). A problem with relying on a wealth effect to 
generate the initial consumption boom, however, is that the late recession is left 
unexplained. 3 
A third hypothesis, first suggested by Calvo (1986), is based on the idea that 
the program may lack credibility in the sense that the public expects the program 
to be discontinued in the future. In Calvo's (1986) model, money is introduced 
through a cash-in-advance constraint. Therefore, the opportunity cost of holding 
money (i.e., the nominal interest rate) is part of the 'effective' price of consumption. 
A reduction in the nominal interest rate which is viewed as temporary 
reduces the effective price of today's consumption relative to future consumption, 
thus inducing a rise in consumption. 
Calvo and Vegh (1993) introduce a second (non-traded) consumption good and 
sticky prices into the picture and show how a non-credible stabilization leads to a 
consumption boom in both the traded and non-traded goods sectors. Furthermore, 
the inflation rate of home goods falls by less than the rate of devaluation on 
impact, thus generating a sustained real appreciation of the domestic currency,   5
which reduces aggregate demand. Hence, a recession may occur even before the 
program is expected to be discontinued, as was the case, for instance, in the 
Chilean and Uruguayan tablitas (see Figure 1). Thus, as argued by Vegh (1992), the 
'temporariness' hypothesis is capable of generating predictions that match most of 
the stylized facts of exchange rate-based stabilization in chronic inflation countries. 
A key issue regarding the 'temporariness' hypothesis, however, is its empirical 
relevance. Specifically, the question is whether the fall in nominal interest rates 
that has been observed in exchange rate-based stabilization programs can explain 
the rise in private consumption. Skeptics point out that intertemporal elasticities of 
substitution are low (or, even worse, not significantly different from zero) and 
proceed to dismiss the 'temporariness' hypothesis on these grounds. However, 
much of the empirical evidence that suggested little or no role for intertemporal 
considerations was based on highly simplified one-good, non-monetary models. 
More recent empirical work - including the one presented in this paper - which 
uses models that allow for more than one good and/or money, has mostly yielded 
higher, statistically significant estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
Using these recent estimates, this paper provides a first attempt to evaluate 
the quantitative importance of the 'temporariness' hypothesis in explaining the 
observed consumption booms. 
The paper develops a one-good model of a small open economy in which 
money is held to reduce transactions costs. The model yields a closed-form 
solution for consumption as a function of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
the time path of the nominal interest rate, and the credibility horizon (i.e., the   6
number of periods that the program is expected to last). Assuming that the initial 
nominal interest rate is expected to prevail again at some time in the future, we 
compute (using our own and other available parameter estimates) the predicted 
increases in consumption for the seven stabilization programs shown in Fig. 1. The 
model's predictions are then compared with the actual consumption data. 
The main conclusion that emerges from the analysis is that in those episodes in 
which nominal interest rates fell by at least 15 percent per quarter (i.e., the 
Austral, Cruzado, Israeli, and Mexican plans), the predicted increase in consumption 
is of an order of magnitude that compares well with the actual figures. In the 
other three episodes (the Southern-Cone 'tablitas'), the fall in nominal interest 
rates, which was in the order of 5 percent per quarter, produces an increase in 
consumption that fails to account for any significant fraction of the actual increase. 
In sum, the numerical results presented in this paper suggest that, in spite of low 
elasticities of substitution, the 'temporariness' hypothesis may still be quantitatively 
important in programs in which nominal interest rates fell sharply. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives a 
closed-form solution for consumption. Section 3 reviews estimates of the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution and parameters of the demand for money (including 
our own estimates, which are presented in an Appendix). These parameter values 
are used in Section 4 to compute predicted increases in consumption, which are 
then compared to the actual figures. Section 5 concludes. 
 
   7
2. The model 
Consider a small open economy inhabited by a large number of identical, 
infinitely lived individuals, who are blessed with perfect foresight. The representative 
consumer maximizes 
 
Where β is the discount factor (0 to 1); c denotes consumption of the only (nonstorable) 
good; and ρ (>0) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.  
Money will be introduced through a transactions-costs technology (see, for 
instance, Reinhart, 1990; Kimbrough, 1992). Transactions costs (s), which are 
assumed to be increasing in consumption and decreasing in real money balances, 
are given by 
 
where m( =- M/P) stands for real money balances (M and P denote nominal  money 
balances and the price level, respectively). 6   In addition to money, there is an 
internationally traded bond (b) whose constant real rate of return is r. The intertemporal 
budget constraint is thus 
 
where y denotes the endowment of the tradable good, τ are real transfers from the 
government, i is the nominal interest rate, and I(≡ i/(1 + i)) is the opportunity 
cost of holding real money balances.   8
The consumer maximizes (1) subject to (2) and (3), given his initial assets, b_ 1 




denotes the effective price of consumption and  λ is the (time-invariant) multiplier 
associated with the budget constraint (3). Eq. (4) is the familiar optimality 
condition whereby the consumer equates the marginal utility of consumption to the 
shadow value of wealth,  λ , times the 'effective' price of consumption, p. The 
effective price of consumption, given by (6), consists of the market price of the 
good (equal to unity) plus the transactions costs incurred by purchasing an 
additional unit of the good. 
Eq. (5) indicates that the consumer equates, at the margin, the reduction in 
transactions costs that results from holding an additional unit of real money 
balances to its opportunity cost, I. This first-order condition implicitly defines a 
demand for money with standard properties: 
 
Substituting Eq. (7) into (6), if follows that 
 
 
which indicates that the effective price is an increasing function of I. 8   9
Consider now the behavior of the government. The government is assumed to 
transfer to the consumer all proceeds from money creation. Furthermore, it will be 
assumed that transactions costs are a private rather than a social cost. 9 Formally, 
the government is posited to provide shopping services to the consumer at no cost 
to the government. The proceeds from such an activity are then transferred back to 
the consumer in a lump-sum way. 10 The government's intertemporal budget 
constraint is thus 
 
 
where h_- 1 denotes the government's initial stock of bonds.  11 
 




Eq. (10) simply states that the present discounted value of consumption must equal 
the present discounted value of tradable resources. 
Using (4), (8), and (10), a closed-form solution for consumption obtains: 
 
where 
   10
defines permanent income as of time 0. 
Eq. (11) expresses equilibrium consumption in period t as a function of the 
elasticity of substitution and the time path of the nominal interest rate. Consumption 
at time t is proportional to (initial) permanent income, y. The factor of 
proportionality, which can be viewed as the marginal propensity to consume 
(MPC) out of (initial) permanent income, consists of the ratio of an average 
effective price of consumption over the consumer's lifetime to the current effective 
price. 12 To illustrate this point, suppose that ρ = 1. It is then apparent that 
the numerator of the MPC in Eq. (11) takes the average of the inverse of the 
effective price at each point in time and then inverts it, thus yielding an average 
effective price over the period [0,∞). This average is compared to the current 
effective price (the denominator of the MPC in Eq. (11)). If the effective price 
remains constant forever, then the average price equals the current price (i.e., the 
MPC is unity), and consumption is always equal to permanent income. It 
immediately follows that a once and for all change in the effective price has no 
impact on the time path of consumption. 13 In contrast, whenever the current 
effective price is below (above) the average effective price, the MPC is above 
(below) unity, and consumption is higher (lower) than initial permanent income. 
The reason is that consumption is cheaper (more expensive) at that point in time 
that it will be on average. Therefore, if the effective price is expected to increase 
at a future date (say t = T) and remain at that higher level thereafter, the current 
effective price during [0,T) will be lower than the average price, and consumption 
will be higher than initial permanent income during [0,T). When the current   11
effective price increases at T, it will be higher than the average price and 
consumption will be below initial permanent income from T on. 
When the elasticity of substitution is different from unity, the same interpretation 
remains valid. The only difference is that the ratio between the average and 
the current effective price is 'adjusted' by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
in the sense that effective prices are raised to the power ρ. As a result, a 
given difference between the average and current prices will be magnified if ρ > 1 
or dampened if ρ < 1. 
To capture a temporary stabilization, we assume the following path of the 
nominal interest rate. 14 Suppose that initially (i.e., for t < 0), the nominal interest 
rate is expected to remain constant at i n , which implies that consumption equals 
permanent income. 15 At t = 0, the interest rate falls, but is expected to go back to 
its initial level at time T. Formally 
  
where i 
L < i 
H. Letting I 
j ≡ i 
J
 /(1 + i 
j) for j = L,H, it follows that I 
L < I 
H. By 
Eq. (8), consumption will be cheaper during [0,T) than after time T, which 
induces consumers to increase consumption. 16 Using (11) and (13), we obtain 
    
which expresses the (higher and constant) level of consumption between 0 and T 
as a function of T, P, and p(I
L)/p(I
H). Eq. (14) constitutes the basis for the 
numerical analysis of Section 4.   12
The key comparative-statics results of temporary stabilization follow from Eq. 
(14). First, the shorter the period of time during which the low price prevails, the 
higher is consumption (i.e., cT < 0). 17 Intuitively, a lower T implies that the 
average price is higher, which, given the time path of the effective price, results in 
a higher MPC. Second, the higher is the elasticity of substitution, the higher is 
consumption (i.e., cρ > 0). Third, the lower is the ratio of the low effective price to 
the high effective price, the higher is consumption (i.e., c x < 0, where x ≡ p(I
L)/p(1
H)), 
because the good is cheaper during [0,T). 
To quantify the effects of the different parameters on consumption, the transactions 
technology needs to be specified. Let 
 




For given values of the parameters of the transactions technology (k0 and kl), 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (ρ), the credibility horizon (T), the real 
interest rate (r), i 
H, and i 
L, Eqs. (14) and (16) allow us to compute the increase in 
consumption that results from a fall in nominal interest rates. The next section 
discusses estimates of these parameters in order to carry out the calculations in 
Section 4. 
   13
 
3. The parameters of consumer preferences: empirical evidence 
The magnitude of the change in consumption in response to a temporary change 
in the nominal interest rate critically depends on the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution. As discussed in Section 2, a given temporary reduction in the 
nominal interest rate will induce a larger increase in consumption when current 
and future consumption are close substitutes (i.e., ρ is high) than when the degree 
of intertemporal substitutability is low. This section first reviews the relevant 
empirical evidence on this crucial parameter, and then briefly summarizes the estimates 
of the parameters of money demand which also affect consumption behavior. 
3.1. Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
This brief survey is not intended to cover the vast literature which has estimated 
ρ for industrial countries, but rather to summarize the relatively infrequent 
application of the Euler-equation approach to developing country data. Specifically, 
our focus is on the six countries which, as illustrated in Figure 1, undertook 
major exchange rate-based stabilization programs. Table 1 summarizes existing 
estimates of ρ  for these countries. As the table highlights (see the fourth column), 
the types of models used for estimation purposes vary considerably across studies. 
The earlier work of Giovannini (1985) and Rossi (1988) used Hall's linearized Euler 
equation, which results from a one-good, non-monetary model. However, as Hall (1988) 
finds for the United States, Giovannini's (1985) estimates for an array of developing 
countries suggest that  ρ is generally not significantly different from zero. Rossi (1988),   14
who allows for the presence of liquidity constraints, finds more evidence of consumption 
smoothing, but estimates for South America still yield ambiguous results.  
A more recent line of research has relaxed some of the restrictive assumptions 
embodied in the one-good, non-monetary model. Models that disaggregate consumption 
by allowing for more than one type of good have found greater empirical support and, in 
general, yielded higher and statistically significant estimates of ρ . This literature includes 
the work of Ostry and Reinhart (1992), whose estimates for Latin America are shown in 
Table 1.  
Another group of papers, including the present one, maintains the one-good 
assumption but incorporates monetary considerations into the consumer's choice 
problem. Some of these models have taken the form of Sidrauski's money-in-theutility- 
function framework (see, for example, Eckstein and Leiderman, 1991; Arrau, 1990). 20 
The transactions-costs model outlined in Section 2 presents an alternative way of 
incorporating money into the consumer's problem. This model, which yields both an 
Euler equation and a demand-for-money function, was estimated for three of the 
countries analyzed here (see the Appendix). As reported in Table 1, the estimates of the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution are statistically significant in all three cases 
(Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay).  
The inclusion of money in consumption decisions thus improves the models' 
ability to fit the data. Monetary models often yield more plausible parameter estimates 
than their pure consumption counterparts and generally perform well in the  
overidentification tests that typically accompany the estimation of rational-expectations 
models. For these reasons, and because of the monetary nature of the underlying   15
theoretical framework, the simulations that follow will use, whenever possible, the 
parameter estimates obtained from monetary models. 
   16




3.2. Parameters of money demand 
While ρ  takes center stage as the most crucial parameter in determining the 
responsiveness of consumption to nominal interest rate shocks, other parameters 
also come into play. As Eqs. (15) and (16) illustrate, the parameters of the money 
demand are needed to determine the path of the effective price of consumption. In 
the most general case, this involves having estimates of both the elasticity of the 
demand for money with respect to consumption and the opportunity cost of 
holding money, i/(1 + i). Such estimates for the countries of interest are summarized 
in Table 2.  21 
Table 2 does not review the considerable literature on the demand for money in   18
developing countries, because most studies rely on annual data and use income as 
the scale variable and i as the measure of opportunity cost. Rather, the approach is 
selective, and includes mostly the results of studies that conform closely to the 
 specification suggested by the theoretical model. As outlined in the Appendix, we 
obtained some of these estimates by jointly estimating the Euler equation with the 
first-order condition that defines the demand for money. Most of the other 
estimates also follow from transactions-costs models (see Arran et al., 1991). 22 
4. Numerical results 
This section uses the closed-form solution for consumption derived in Section 2 
and the parameter estimates discussed in Section 3 to undertake some numerical 
exercises aimed at assessing the quantitative importance of the 'temporariness' 
hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, the public expects that the stabilization plan 
announced by the authorities will be reverted in the future. Therefore, it will be 
assumed throughout this section that the initial interest rate is expected to be 
restored sometime in the future. Hence, the initial fall in the nominal interest rate 
is the same as the expected future increase, which is what is relevant for 
consumption decisions. 23 
The first numerical exercise is intended as an illustration of the order of 
magnitudes involved for a plausible range of parameters. Based on Eqs. (14) and 
(16), Table 3 reports increases in consumption (in percentage points) as a function 
of the fall in the nominal interest rate, for different values of the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution (ranging from 0.1 to 0.8), and the credibility horizon 
(ranging from 1 to 20 quarters). 24 Four initial values of i - which roughly   19
correspond to the actual stabilization episodes discussed below - are considered, 
ranging from 15 to 95 percent per quarter. The nominal interest rate is always 
assumed to fall to 10 percent. From Table 3, four important observations follow: 
(i) There is a wide range of predictions for the rise in consumption depending on 
the parameter configuration, the lowest being 0.68 percent and the highest 
being 55.11 percent. 
(ii) For given ρ and T, the magnitude of the fall in i has a dramatic effect on the 
rise in consumption. Consider, for instance, the row in Table 3 corresponding 
to T = 4 and ρ = 0.3. The rise in consumption varies from 2.32 to 17.46 
percent depending on the magnitude of the fall in i. 
(iii) For a given fall in i and a given T, changes in ρ substantially affect the 
initial rise in consumption. Consider, for instance, a fall in i from 45 to 10 
percent. For T = 4, the rise in consumption varies from 3.5 percent (for 
ρ = 0.1) to 31.57 percent (for ρ = 0.8). 
(iv) For a given fall in i and a given value of ρ, the increase in consumption 
responds very little to changes in the credibility horizon. For instance, 
consider the case in which i falls from 95 to 10 percent and ρ = 0.1. When 
T= 1, the rise in consumption is 5.65 percent; when T= 20, the rise in 
consumption is still 4.87 percent. For higher values of p, the impact of a 
higher T is larger but still relatively unimportant compared to changes in 
other parameters. Intuitively, this lack of responsiveness of the rise in 
 




consumption to the credibility horizon is explained by the fact that the weight 
given to the low effective price (which depends on T) in computing the 
average effective price remains small compared to the relevant time horizon 
(infinity). 25 
We now turn to the main numerical exercise, reported in Table 4, which 
consists in computing the predicted rises in consumption for the seven major 
stabilization programs illustrated in Figure 1 and comparing these predictions to the   21
actual figures. 
Column (1) in Table 4 reports the first quarter during which the plan was in 
effect. 26 Column (3) indicates the (deposit) nominal interest rate prevailing in the 
quarter before the plan was implemented, which is taken as i 
H. 27 The criteria 
used for columns (2), (4) and (5) vary according to whether the plans were 
successful or not. For the plans that failed (the three 'tablitas,' the Austral, and the 
Cruzado plans), the basic criterion was to identify a point in time (reported as 'last 
quarter' in column (2)) at which the nominal interest rate went back to values 
comparable with those prevailing at the beginning of the stabilization, thus 
identifying an 'interest-rate cycle.' 28 29 The value of T in column (5) is the 
number of quarters that the interest-rate cycle lasted. The lowest nominal interest 
rate observed during this period, reported in column (4), was taken as i 
L. 
For the successful stabilizations of Israel and Mexico, a period of five years 
following the implementation of the programs was taken as the relevant time 
frame. The final quarter of this period is reported as the 'last quarter' (column 
(2)). 30 Column (4) reports the lowest nominal interest rate during this period, 
which is used as i 
L. The parameter T (column (5)) was chosen as the number of 
quarters in the program after which private consumption reached its maximum 
value. 
In all cases, column (6) reports the relevant value of ρ, based on the discussion 
in Section 3, while column (7) indicates the value of the actual increase in 
consumption, computed by comparing the peak level of (seasonally adjusted) 
   22
private consumption during the period determined by columns (1) and (2) to the 
initial value. 31 Column (8) reports the predicted increase in consumption, which 
results from using the chosen values of T, ρ, i
 L, and i 
H in Eqs. (14) and (16). 
Finally, column (9) compares actual versus predicted values. 
Column (9) suggests that, in the Southern-Cone 'tablitas,' the 'temporariness' 
hypothesis accounts only for about 10 percent of the actual increase in consumption. 
32 Given the magnitude of the observed fall in nominal interest rates, Table 3 
suggests that the results are robust in the sense that even somewhat higher 
elasticities of substitution would imply increases in consumption that fall way 
short of actual ones. 33 
In contrast, for the shock programs of the mid 1980s, the 'temporariness' 
hypothesis works fairly well since it predicts increases in consumption that 
account from 66 to 83 percent of the actual increase in three of the four plans (see 
column (9)). In the Cruzado Plan, the model overstates the actual rise. Hence, in 
spite of relatively low elasticities of substitution, the fall in nominal interest rates 
was large enough to lend support to the 'temporariness' hypothesis. Furthermore, 
Table 3 suggests that, given the observed declines in nominal interest rates, 
elasticities of substitution would have to be substantially lower for the overall 
conclusion to change. 
5. Final remarks 
This paper represents a first attempt to evaluate the quantitative importance of 
the 'temporariness' hypothesis in explaining the initial consumption boom observed 
in exchange rate-based stabilizations. A closed-form solution for consumption   23
was used to compute the predicted increases in consumption in seven major 
stabilizations programs. In four out of seven cases, the model predicts increases in 
consumption that account for at least two thirds of those observed. In the three 
remaining cases, the predicted rises in consumption account for only a small share 
of the actual increase in consumption. Our results thus suggest that the ' temporariness' 
hypothesis might be quantitatively relevant in episodes in which nominal 
interest rates fell by a substantial amount (i.e., by more than 15 percentage points 
 per quarter). Since intertemporal elasticities of substitution are small, large dedines 
in interest rates are needed to generate consumption booms of the order of 
magnitude that has been observed. 
We feel that, if anything, the estimates provided in this paper should be viewed 
as a lower bound for the importance of the 'temporariness' hypothesis. The reason 
is that the model does not incorporate durable goods, which play an important role 
in practice since a large part of the upsurge in consumption takes the form of 
imported durable goods. 34 The presence of durable goods is likely to increase the 
quantitative importance of intertemporal substitution for two main reasons. First, 
the introduction of durable goods might yield higher intertemporal elasticities of 
substitution, as found by Fauvel and Sampson (1991) for Canada. Second, in 
addition to intertemporal consumption substitution, durable goods would introduce 
intertemporal price substitution because goods can be stored (see Calvo, 1988). 
Unfortunately, data on durable goods consumption for most of these countries 
(with Israel being a notable exception) is not readily available, which makes an 
empirical verification of the importance of these effects rather difficult.   24
 Appendix 
A.1. Consumption path with wealth effect 
Suppose that transactions costs constitute a social cost. Then, proceeding as in 
the text, and under the assumption that i follows the path given by (13), it can be 
shown that the path of consumption is given by 
    
 
Note that setting {1 + v[L(I
L)]}/{1 + v[L(I
H)]} = 1 is equivalent to eliminating 
the wealth effect. If y is adjusted so as to ensure that initial consumption is the 
same in both cases (i.e., with and without wealth effect), Eq. (A.1) indicates that 
consumption increases by more in the presence of the wealth effect. This is to be 
expected because transactions costs per unit of consumption after t = 0 are, on 
average, lower than before, which results in a positive wealth effect. 
Eq. (A.2) indicates that consumption falls at time T, as was the case before. 
However, depending on how strong the wealth effect is, it follows from Eq. (A.2)   25
that consumption after T could be higher than initially. Note, incidentally, that this 
is a sufficient condition to ensure that a temporary stabilization could be welfare 
improving. In sharp contrast, temporary stabilization is always welfare decreasing 
in cash-in-advance models (i.e., Calvo, 1986), because there are no wealth effects 
which may offset intertemporal distortions (see Kimbrough (1992) for a related 
discussion). 
A.2. Empirical estimates 
Consider the following general transactions technology: 
 
where θ represents a proxy for financial innovation (which often takes the form of 
dollarization), an important phenomenon in high-inflation countries. In this more 
general setting (with uncertainty), the first-order conditions are given by: 
 
Eq. (A.4) defines the demand for money, while Eq. (A.5) describes the dynamics 
of consumption. 35 The effective price of consumption, pt, is defined as 
 
The two first-order conditions (A.4) and (A.5) were jointly estimated using 
Hansen's (1982) generalized method of moments (GMM). The estimation results 
   26
 
 are presented in Table A.1, which also describes the sample period and provides 
the J-statistics that test the overidentifying restrictions of the model. 36 
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Endnotes 
 
1 In industrial countries, consumption booms have also been observed in the first stages 
of the 1982 Danish and 1987 Irish exchange rate-based stabilizations (see Giavazzi and 
Pagano, 1990). 
 
2 Mexico is a notable exception in that no late recession occurred. 
 
3 Real interest rates rose in four of the seven programs illustrated in Figure 1 (Austral, 
Cruzado, Israeli, and Mexican plans); see Vegh (1992). 
 
4 De Gregorio et al. (1993) is an exception, in that the initial 'bunching' in durable goods 
consumption caused by the wealth effect leads to a later recession. 
 
5 Introducing money in such a way retains the intuitive appeal of cash-in-advance models 
but allows for a variable velocity, an essential ingredient in any empirically oriented 
model. 
 
6 For simplicity, we assume that the transactions-costs technology is homogeneous of 
degree one in real money balances and consumption. This implies that the consumption-
elasticity of money demand is unity (see below), which is generally supported by the data 
(see the Appendix). 
 
7. To ensure the existence of a steady state, it is assumed that β(1 + r) = 1. 
 
8 For a general transactions technology, the effective price of consumption is increasing 
in both c and L The assumption of constant returns to scale implies that the effective price 
depends only on 1. 
 
9 This assumption is intended to capture the spirit of cash-in-advance models in which 
transacting is not costly from a social point of view. It also enables us to isolate the 
quantitative effects of intertemporal consumption substitution. As discussed in the 
Appendix, assuming that transacting is socially costly implies that a temporary 
stabilization has a.positive wealth effect, which would only reinforce the initial 
consumption boom discussed below. 
 
10 Alternatively, it could be assumed that private firms provide these services. As the 
owner of these firms, the consumer would receive the proceeds from such an activity. 
ix Note that since the initial stock of real money balances is in the hands of the consumer, 
it constitutes a liability for the government. 
 
12 This interpretation follows Calvo and Vegh (1990). 
 
13 If transactions costs were a social cost, then a permanent reduction in the nominal 
interest rate would lead to a wealth effect (by reducing transactions costs), and thus to a   33
higher level of consumption. The path of consumption, however, would still be flat over 
time. 
 
14 In the presence of perfect capital mobility, the nominal interest rate moves one-to-one 
with the rate of devaluation through the interest rate parity condition. Hence, the interest 
rate should be thought of as reflecting policy changes in the rate of devaluation. 
 
15 The initial value of the nominal interest rate is formally irrelevant since permanent 
changes in i are supemeutral. In other words, all that matters is the path of i for t >0. For 
conceptual purposes,however, it is useful to interpret this path as a temporary fall in the 
nominal interest rate. 
 
16 It can be shown that, for the interest rate path specified in (13), the average effective 
price of consumption is a weighted average of p(iL) and p(iH), with the weights 
depending on the length of time during which each effective price is in effect. 
 
17 Subscripts denote partial derivatives. 
 
18 The coefficient of intertemporal substitution is statistically significant only when the 
debt crisis years 1982-83 are excluded from the sample. 
 
19 Papers by Ceglowski (1991) and Mankiw (1985) apply the multi-good approach to the 
United States data. 
 
20 For an application to U.S. data, see Poterba and Rotemberg (1987). Their estimate of ρ 
is low,around 0.15, but significantly different from zero. 
 
21 Note, however, that in the specific technology outlined in the previous section (Eq. 
(2)), it is assumed that the consumption-elasticity of money demand is unity. As Table 2 
indicates, this restriction appears to accord rather well with the data. 
 
22 In addition to using the specification implied by theory, the estimates presented in 
Table 2 also have the advantage that the sample periods covered include most of the 
stabilization episodes of interest. 
 
23 The advantage of this criterion is that it can be applied to both successful and 
unsuccessful programs. An alternative strategy for the failed programs would be to take 
the nominal interest rate prevailing at the end of the program as the 'terminal' condition. 
As discussed below, using this alternative criterion would not change the basic message 
of this section since, in most of the failed programs, nominal interest rates at the end of 
the programs did not differ markedly from their pre-stabilization levels (see Figure 1). 
 
24 The parameters k 0 and k 1 were set to 48.29 and 8.26, respectively, which are the 
averages of the estimates for Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay reported in the Appendix 
(under the assumption that k 1 = 1 + k2, as discussed in the Appendix). In addition, r was 
set to 0.007417 (3% in annual terms) and y to unity.   34
25 The relative unimportance of T should be viewed as an appealing feature of the model 
because too much responsiveness of the rise in consumption to T would make any actual 
value consistent with the predictions of the model, given that T is an unobservable 
variable. 
 
26 If a program started late in a given quarter, then the first quarter of the program is 
taken to be the following one. 
 
27 The complete data set for each program is available upon request. 
 
28 This seems a natural criterion since the 'temporariness' hypothesis is based on the idea 
that the nominal interest rate is expected to go back to its initial level. 
 
29 Note that, with the exception of the Austral plan, the 'last quarter' so chosen roughly 
coincides with the actual end of the programs (Figure 1). In the case of the Austral plan, a 
succession of plans delayed the return of nominal interest rates to levels comparable 
(although still lower) to those prevailing before the plan. 
 
30 Although this is an arbitrary choice, it was inspired by the Israeli plan where the 
consumption boom-recession cycle covered a period of five years (Figure 1). 
 
31 For Argentina, consumption figures refer to total (private and public) consumption. 
 
32 Elsewhere (Reinhart and V6gh, 1992), we argue that taking into account the effects of 
lower real interest rates improves considerably the predictive power of the model for 
Chile, somewhat for Argentina, and not at all for Uruguay. 
 
33 - If interest rates observed around the end of the program were used as i H, the share 
of predicted to actual increase in consumption would be 6.5 percent for Chile, 21.7 
percent for Argentina, and 34.5 percent for Uruguay. Hence, although there is an 
improvement in the predictions of the model for Argentina and, in particular, Uruguay, 
the fact remains that the temporariness hypothesis accounts for at most a third of the 
actual consumption increase. 
34 The role of durable goods in stabilization programs has been emphasized by, among 
others, Dombusch (1985), Calvo (1988), Drazen (1990), and De Gregorio et al. (1993). 
 
35 Note that the theoretical model of Section 2 assumes that k 1 = 1 + k 2 (which sets to 
unity the consumption-elasticity) and k 3 = 0. 
 
36 The reader is referred to Reinhart and Vegh (1992) - who estimate a variant of this 
model – for greater detail of the data, the estimation methods, and a discussion of some of 
the problems encounter 
 
 
 